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The trade-offs made by a Program Manager in a weapon
system program are frequently at the expense of logistics
support. This thesis is a case study of the logistics
support of an electronic warfare system program, designated
AN/SLQ-32. The AN/SLQ-32 Program provides an example of the
classic problems that result when logistic planning is
neglected and underfunded in a weapon system program. The
initiatives taken by the Navy to correct the logistic prob-
lems of the AN/SLQ-32 are presented with respect to their
impact on two measures of effectiveness; Operational
Availability and Systems Material Availability. The
research concludes that to ensure a weapon system will meet
its Operational Availability goals there must be a sound
logistic support plan established early in the program and
it must be strictly adhered to and monitored.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTION
This thesis is a case study of the logistic support
problems of an Electronic Warfare System Program, designated
as the AN/SLQ-32. The AN/SLQ-32 Program was selected for
this thesis because it provides an example of the classic
problems that result when logistic planning is neglected in
a weapon system program. The presentation of these logistic
problems, along with the initiatives that were taken to
correct them, provides a vehicle for learning and under-
standing the basic need for logistic planning and the impor-
tance of reliability, maintainability and supportability on
life cycle support
.
The AN/SLQ-32 Program experiences severe logistic
support problems, primarily in the key areas of reliability,
maintainability and supportability. These three areas are
components of Operational Availability (Ao), which is a
measure of the degree to which the AN/SLQ-32 is in the oper-
able and commitable state when the mission is randomly
called for [Ref. 1] . Simply stated, Operational
Availability (Ao) is a ratio of a weapon system's operating
time to its downtime.
Supportability is the evaluated component of System
Material Availability (SMA). Systems Material Availability
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is a Navy supply system wholesale measure of the Navy's
inventory control point. It is defined as a percent of
requisitions that are satisfied on the first pass against
supply system assets. The SMA performance measure is an
indication of the Navy's ability to provide supply support
to a weapon system. It is the unacceptablly low Ao and SMA
levels experienced by the AN/SLQ-32 that gives the system
its notoriety and spotlights its logistic deficiencies.
The research question of the thesis is "What Are the
Supply Support Problems of the AN/SLQ-32 Program and How is
the Navy Solving These Problems With Respect to Operational
Availability (Ao) and Systems Material Availability (SMA)."
The research question highlights the impact of poor
logistic planning on the life cycle support of the weapon
system. Logistic planning is an important, but often
neglected, part of a weapon system program. A Logistic Plan
philosophy is to provide the least cost logistic support
that is fully responsible to the life cycle requirements
that are imposed by equipment design, use, mission and the
operational environment. There are many different methods
that a logistic plan can follow. In the AN/SLQ-32 Program,
two methods in particular, the Design-To-Price (DTP)
contracting method and a very contractor-dependent interim
support philosophy, were instrumental in influencing its
early logistic planning and decision making. These two
philosophies, along with funding priority deficiencies will
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be presented in this thesis as the events that most
influenced the AN/SLQ-32 Programs logistic support problems.
The thesis presents the logistic problems that the AN/SLQ-32
Program experienced and how they effect reliability,
maintainability and supportability
.
The logistic problems that the program experienced were
of such magnitude that in order to provide the system with
some effective support, the Navy ended the interim contrac-
tors support period early and accelerated the transition to
Navy support. The system's early transition and significant
logistic deficiencies presented the Navy with a situation
that required bold corrective initiatives. The initiatives
taken were not temporary corrective measures but instead
were well thought out, intensively managed measures that
sought to remedy the problems and not just the symptoms.
The initiatives are presented with respect to how they
impact the functions of reliability, maintainability and
supportability. By doing this the reader will be given an
understanding and an appreciation of the reasons for
selecting the initiatives.
B . APPROACH
The initial thrust of this thesis is to provide a case
study of a weapon system that experienced severe support
problems and research the reasons for the problems and the
initiatives taken to solve them. The AN/SLQ-32 program was
selected for two reasons. First it provided many examples
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of the consequences of poor logistic planning. Second, the
initiatives that were used are good examples of the organ-
ized effort that is required to improve system support.
Data and information were obtained from the organiza-
tions involved in the AN/SLQ-32 program. The Space and
Warfare Command (formerly Naval Electronics Systems
Command) code, PME-107, the Program Manager and code 08, the
Logistics Managers, were two of the sources of information
for this research. These two codes provided information on
the programs Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) plan, the
Logistic Assessment Reviews (LAR) and the current status of
their initiatives. The Naval Supply Systems Command, code
03, Fleet Support, provided information on the Detection
Action Response Team (DART) and background on the acceler-
ated transition decisions. The contractor, Raytheon in
Goleta California, was able to provide information on the
original contract. The Inventory Control Point (ICP), Ships
Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa., provided the
updated information relating to the initiatives taken and
their effects on Operational Availability and System
Material Availability. Most of the information gathered for
this research was from the files of the three Navy commands
that were previously mentioned. The early history and back-
ground was obtained through interviews with people involved
in the program's early phases and from members of the tran-
sition support team. This thesis assumes some basic
14
knowledge of the different phases of weapon system
acquisition. [Ref. 2]. The thesis completed by LT . Michael
F. Sule [Ref. 3] will aid in understanding the NAVELEX
method of planning for follow on spare support.
C. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides the background and history on the
need for an Electronic Warfare Countermeasure System and the
evolution of the AN/SLQ-32 to fill that need. The background
and history details the many logistic support problems that
the system experienced. Chapter III introduces Operational
Availability (Ao) and System Material Availability (SMA).
These are two measures by which weapon system support is
evaluated. The chapter then attempts to provide an under-
standing of how each initiative that was taken effected the
different parts of the Ao and SMA equations. Chapter IV
provides a summary and conclusion describing several of the
lessons learned from the program and some of the problems
that still exist.
15
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the need for a
new Electronic Warfare System for surface ships and to
address the factors leading to the design -to-price concept.
Emphasis is placed on the design-to-price concept's key
objectives and their effect on the AN/SLQ-32, the electronic
warfare system that was developed under this concept. The
AN/SLQ-32 history is presented with emphasis on its policy
of total contractor support and the supply support problems
that this presented.
B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The AN/SLQ-32 is a major electronic warfare system. It
is provided in three operational configurations or variants,
designated (V)l, (V)2, (V)3 and one training configuration
designated (V)T1. Each operational variant provides
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) in the form of detection,
identification and bearing of Radar Frequency (RF) emiters
in one or more of the three designated frequency bands, and
each provides a Decoy Launching System (DLS) control. The
(V)l is the basic ESM equipment and provides frequency
coverage in the high threat band 3 spectrum only. The (V)2
configuration expands the frequency range to a wide band
coverage by the modular addition of two receivers covering
16
bands 1 and 2. Further expansion in functional capability
is achieved in the (V)3 variant through the addition of an
Active Electronic Countermeasure (AECM) capability.
[Ref. 4]
The basic functional capabilities of each variant and






(V)l -Band 3 receive AE, AFS, AGF |
-Super Rapid Blooming FF, LKA , LPD
,
|
Offboard Chaff (SRBOC) LSD
Launching Capability
1 (V)2 -Bands 1,2 and 3 receive DD, DDG, FF,
-SRBOC Launching capability FFG
1
(V)3 -Bands 1,2 and 3 receive AOE , AOR, BB,
-SRBOC Launching Capability CG, CGN, LCC,
-Band 3 AECM Capability LHA
,
LPH
Figure 2.1 Functional Capabilities and Platforms.
C. DESIGN-TO-PRICE ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEVELOPMENT
The need for an electronic warfare system for ships'
self defense against missiles was recognized prior to 1960.
In the 1960 's new technologies inspired research and
17
development in the area of electronic warfare (EW). The
project that explored the use of these new technologies for
EW was a project was called SHORTSTOP EW and it developed
some very effective systems, but their costs were prohib-
itive. Modifications to improve the capabilities of existing
systems had been developed and procured, but the inherent
limitations of the original design prevented enhancement of
their capabilities to the degree necessary to meet the
threat. The Navy was prompted in 1971 to introduce a new
program approach which was designed to produce a family of
modular electronic warfare system components from which
suitable configurations for a wide range of ships could be
obtained at an affordable cost. A need still existed to
replace the antiquated and inadequate AN/WLR-1 receiver and
An/ULQ-6 repeater in the fleet and to provide up to date
capabilities for new construction ships. The only other
systems available at that time ( AN/SLQ-17 and AN/WLR-8 )
were also unaffordable for the 300 or so ships that needed
new systems. The new program was a competitive development
of production prototype equipments which were to be designed
to meet predetermined production prices. [Ref. 5:p.Bl]
In May 1972, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
authorized the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) to initiate
,
in FY73, development of a low cost electronic warfare suite
modularized in such a way that a maximum number of plat-
forms, including surface and aircraft, could be outfited for
18
a passive Electronic Warfare (EW) capability, using common
components, and larger ships could be given greater capa-
bility by adding active components to the system. Three cost
levels were established, ranging from $300,000 to $3,000,000
for a unit production, initial support, and installation
costs. [Ref. 5:p.2.3]
The systems to be developed were to be modularized to
provide three levels of capability, suited to three sizes of
ships. The lowest cost system would monitor the RF bands of
highest interest and provide automatic detection, identifi-
cation, and bearing information on approaching anti-ship
missile threats. The cost of this system, designated (V)l,
was set at $300,000 each, including support equipment,
initial spare parts, and installation in 116 Fast Frigate
(FF) size ships.
The second or (V)2 system would consist of the (V)l unit
with added receivers, antennas and a larger threat library,
to enable detection and identification of more emiters,
particularly those associated with anti-ship missile plat-
forms. The produced and installed cost was set at $500,000
based on installation in 118 ships of Destroyer (DD) size.
The third, or (V)3, system would consist of the (V)2
units with an active Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) system
capability added, capable of automatically generating an
appropriate jamming or deception signal against a large
number of threat emiters simultaneously . It was priced at
19
$ 1,400,000 per system installed in 59 ships of Guided
Missile Cruiser (CG) or larger size. [Ref. 5:p.5] The
essential feature of this development was that the produc-
tion price levels were to be considered non-negotiable, and
contractors were to compete to provide the best overall
anti-ship missile defense capability they could for the
price. The contractors were provided a list of desired capa-
bilities, descriptions of shipboard environment, and
descriptions of battle scenarios in which the system must be
effective. Provided certain minimum requirements were met,
they were free to make tradeoffs among the various specific
performance characteristics ( sensitivity, power, accuracy,
speed, etc.), reliability, availability, and operating and
support costs. At the completion of the engineering devel-
opment phase, the competing systems were to be evaluated and
the better system was to be selected. [Ref. 5:p.2]
The selection of contractors for the development phase
of the DTP EW suite was initiated in July 1972. Seventy-five
industrial companies indicated an interest in competing in
the development of this system under the new Design-To-Price
(DTP) Electronic Warfare concept. From these 75 companies,
15 were selected by the Navy as being the best qualified to
manage and execute such a program from a design competition
through production. These 15 received Requests for
Proposals, as did an additional 28 companies who requested
bid sets. Out of this potential 43 bidders, only 12
companies submitted proposals as prime contractors by the 12
November 1972 deadline. From these 12 bidders the Navy
selected six to participate in the initial design competi-
tion. The Navy conducted intensive studies of the proposals
utilizing various criteria, including system simulation, and
selected two contractors, the Hughes Aircraft Company and
the Raytheon Company, for the competitive development. After
evaluation of the Technical Evaluation (TECHEVAL) and
Operation Evaluation (OPEVAL) results, the estimates of
military utility, and the estimated life cycle costs of the
two systems, the source selection authority selected the
Raytheon AN/SLQ-32 for production. [Ref. 5:p.3]
D. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Naval Electronics Systems Command (PME-107) is the
Program Manager (PM) for the AN/SLQ-32 program. The PM is
the primary advocate for the program and is responsible for
the technical and business/ financial management of the
program. He must completely understand the military need
for the system and must become intimately familiar with the
system as it evolves. The PM is alone responsible for the
success or failure of the program and his responsibilities
include planning, development, programming, acquisition,
installation, logistics and technical support of the equip-
ment throughout the equipment throughout life cycle of the
system. [Ref. 6:p.l-16]
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The PM is assisted with the Integrated Logistics Support
(ILS) policy and monitoring responsibilities by Navelex 08,
the Life Cycle Engineering and Platform Integration
Directorate. Navelex 08 conducts Logistic Assessment Reviews
(LAR) , which are critical reviews designed to evaluate the
sufficiency of the logistics plan. Each Navelex project has
an Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) sponsor.
The OPNAV sponsor for the AN/SLQ-32 is OP-03, and they
control the money allotted for the project.
Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, Pa.
was designated as the Program Support Inventory Control
Point (PSICP) . The PSICP is usually designated early on in
the project and they assist the PM with end item and modifi-
cation spares budgeting and the necessary plans, programs
and budgeted resources required to acquire all levels of
initial spares and repair parts [Ref. 7:p.2-16]. Because of
the unique interim support plan used on the AN/SLQ-32
program, SPCC was not involved until the decision was made
to transition early to full Navy support.
The scope of the thesis deals with the logistic respon-
sibilities of the program, in particular, the logistic
support plan and the maintenance plan. The logistic and
maintenance plans, and the unique aspects of the contractors




The logistics program philosophy is to provide the least
cost logistics support that is fully responsible to the life
cycle requirements that are imposed by equipment design,
use, mission and operational environment. To meet these
responsibilities it was decided to use interim contractor
support. This policy gives the responsibility of supply
support to the contractor for the period up to the tran-
sition to the Navy support date. It permits the government
to delay making decisions regarding stocking policy and on
the range and depth allowance decisions until meaningful
reliability and support requirements knowledge can be
acquired through actual systems operations. [Ref. 8:p.l]
The Navy supply system is provided with visibility of system
stock requirements and usage and failure data during this
interim support period.




2 Provide onboard spares
3 Operate a repair parts stock point
4 Operate as the Designated Overhaul Point (DOP)
5 Perform usage data analysis
6 Provide complete Provisioning Technical Documentation
(PTD)
The contractor's spares/repair part stock point is to
operate as a bonded central storage site for spares and
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repair parts during the interim support period. It will
receive, store, hold, issue, account for, identify,
preserve, package, label, prepare for shipment, document and
ship government owned support material and repair parts
allowance requirements. It processes requisitions for
spares and maintains inventory and summary statistics. The
range and depth of the items to be carried was recommended
by the contractor and approved by the PM. [Ref. 9:p.5-3]
The contractors Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) was intended
to be the only DOP for the whole system. It was used to
repair, overhaul and assemble material turned in for repair.
The AN/SLQ-32 was approved for a five year program of
interim contractor support, with an optional transition to
full navy support. This five year program was divided into
two phases. They were Phase 1, Contractor Support Evaluation
and Phase 2, Navy Support Transition. Phase 1 was scheduled
to last 41 months, until October 1980. This phase had three
main objectives:
1 Measure contractor's effectiveness and determine his
ability to support the system at an operational avail-
ability level of 92% and at a reasonable cost.
2 Compare the results of the contractor support evalua-
tion with those achieveable through navy support.
3 Collect actual fleet data, required to establish real-
istic requirements regarding maintenance functions,
stocking policy and range and depth allowances.
Phase 2, Navy Support Transition, was to commence when
and if a navy support decision was reached at the end of
phase 1. The second phase would last 24 months and its main
24
objective would be to assure a smooth and orderly transition
of support functions from contractor to Navy. This would
include
:
1 Full range Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD).
2 Transition of individual items to Navy support.
3 Establish Designated Overhaul Points at subvendors
.
4 Residual stocks held at the contractor repair parts
stock depot would be transferred to Navy stocks.
As the end of phase 1 approached several logistic prob-
lems were identified. A Logistics Review Group Audit (LRG)
and an Acquisition Audit was done in September 1979. These
audit boards are made up of representatives of the Naval
Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) , the Naval Material
Command (NAVMAT), the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP),
Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) and the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). They are responsible for
reviewing and approving the adequacy of the Integrated
Logistics Support (ILS) planning for the acquisition of the
new weapon system. Combined these two audits had an unusu-
ally high 90 discrepancies and revealed among other things:
1 Spare parts support and availability are inadequate
2 The systems technical manuals are substandard
3 Provisioning Technical Documentation has not been
purchased
4 The training of technicians was inadequate
At this time there were 56 systems operational in the
fleet. The system was leading the fleet in CASREPTs and had
25
a combined Operational Availability (Ao) of only 63% with
the (V)3 variant experiencing only 26% Ao
.
[Ref. 10:pp. 19-22]
The results of the audits, the high CASREPT figures and
the low Ao caused concern for the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations (VCNO), VADM Watkins . His fleet commanders
requested to continue using the AN/WLR-1, the electronic
warfare system that the AN/SLQ-32 was to replace. The VCNO
had OP-03, AN/SLQ-32 program sponsor, brief him on the
program's problems. The VCNO discovered that a significant
reason for the problem was that OP-03 drastically reduced
funding to logistics and training in FY 77 through 81. OP-03
and NAVELEX had a sound logistics program on paper but OP-03
underfunded it and did not follow the plan. The VCNO accused
OP-03 of "logistic dishonesty" and ordered that the Logistic
Review Group (LRG) and Acquisition Audit discrepancies be
corrected. [Ref. 11]
F. MAINTENANCE PLAN
The maintenance plan is based upon fast removal of
defective printed circuit cards or similar shipboard
replacement assemblies at the organizational level, with all
repair of failed assemblies at the depot level. There is not
any intermediate maintenance facility since the depot is
expected to have the capability to provide a Ready For Issue
(RFI) backup item immediately from onhand stock.
[Ref. 9:p.3-l] The contractor is required to provide and
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operate the repair depot and refurbish or repair the items
that are returned by the users as Not Ready For Issue. The
organizational level troubleshooting is designed to be
performed by Electronic Warfare Specialists (EW) with the
aid of software used in the internal programs that isolate
faults in replacable assemblies.
G. EARLY TRANSITION
Phase 1 of the five year contractor support plan was
scheduled to be completed in October 1982. In December 1980
because of the supply support problems of the equipment, the
VCNO directed NAVSUP to begin transition supply support with
a Material Support Date (MSD) of October 1982. The lack of
Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD) and the inade-
quate funding of the interim support program forced NAVSUP
to conclude that the October 1982 MSD was not feasible. The
new plan called for beginning transition in January 1983
with transfer to full Navy support in October 1985. A
Transitioning Planning Team was assembled to review the
current Support posture of the program, identify the actions
necessary to effect a full transfer to Navy support and to
develop a transition plan. The team included representa-
tives from NAVELEX, NAVSUP, NESEC Portsmouth, NAVELEX
DETACHMENT Mechanicsburg Pa., and SPCC.
The Navy decided to take control of some items and use
the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) money to purchase spare parts. The
NSF is a working capital fund which is used to purchase and
27
hold inventories of supply items. The fund provided $22.3
million in FY81 for the initial purchase of spares and $34.1
million in FY82. These purchases had lead times of two years
to delivery. The fleet population of the equipment continued
to grow from 56 operational units in 1980 to 173 units in
1982 with a projection of over 300 units by 1987.
[Ref. 12:p.l2] The timetable set up for a 1 October 1985
transition date would have conformed to standard Navy tran-
sition plans, but the AN/SLQ-32 was not a standard program.
The slow transition and complete lack of supply support was
unacceptable to the users in the fleet. CINCPACFLT
message251915z Aug 82 to the CNO addressed the inadequate
supply support that the equipment was receiving. It indi-
cated that one half of all the systems were down with
outstanding Casualty Reports (CASREPT). Average CASREPT
response time increased to 45 days and many parts were just
not available. At this time, even though NAVSUP was
preparing the transition by contracting with Raytheon for
spares and repair of repairables, the contractor was still
providing the interim support. The fleets' requisitions were
being sent directly to Raytheon and, because of the inade-
quate funding of spares, Raytheon had very few spares in
stock. If an urgent CASREPT request came in for an item that
was not in stock in the contractor's repair parts stock
depot, Raytheon would provide parts from its production line
if the line was not interrupted. If parts were still not
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available the PM would often take the parts from units that
were complete and already accepted by the Navy. These units
are then shipped to the fleet with the parts missing, and
the PM would juggle future deliveries to fill the holes.
[Ref. 13: p. 2] This means that if Raytheon has the part they
would fill the CASREPT requisition. Most often the requisi-
tion cannot be filled and the PMs method of cannibalizing
off already accepted systems, cannot work with the
increasing fleet population of the equipment.
In December 1982 NAVSUP decided to step up the tran-
sition timetable. It began on a quarterly basis 1 January
1983 with transition to full Navy support on 1 October 1985.
The reasoning for this decision was the earlier than planned
deliveries of the 1981 buys and the large amount of Navy
Stock Fund (NSF)money that would become available for FY83.
[Ref. 14] The supply system was in a position where NSF
money was becoming available but it could not be used by the
fleet because NAVELEX was still supporting most of the
spares. By transitioning to supply support in quarterly
increments NAVSUP could use NSF money to contract for more
spares. NAVSUP decided that because 70% of the parts were
subcontracted by Raytheon and that they experienced long
lead times, short term support could best be accomplished by
concentrating on the contractors repair and quick turnaround
of NRFI items. The plans of early transition and the large
stock buys were predicated on the performance of this quick
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turnaround by the contractor's DOP. SPCC fully funded a
repair contract with Raytheon for the repair of the 1800
item backlog and the continued repair of NRFI items. The
rapid turnaround of this material was essential to NAVSUP's
efforts to providing short term support to the fleet.
Early transition was also hindered by the lack of
Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD) . PTD is documen-
tation furnished by the contractor for identification,
determination of repair parts requirements, cataloging, and
contractual formalization of items to be procured. The
primary data used to determine initial requirements is
contained in a Provisioning Parts List (PPL) . The PPL
contains all support items which can be disassembled, reas-
sembled, replaced and which, when combined, constitute an
end item. The PPL contains all items which are essential to
the operation and maintenance of the end item and is partic-
ularly important for transition to Navy support. This data
enables the Navy to establish its own organic repair facili-
ties and assist in finding second source contractors.
Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD) was in the orig-
inal contract with Raytheon but was not purchased by the PM.
The PM saw the PTD as an unnecessary expense which would not
be needed while the contractor was providing the supply
support. Without PTD, SPCC is unable to make purchasing deci-
sions on spares. Raytheon was asked by the Navy to do the
PTD, but a problem existed in that Raytheon only
30
manufactured 30% of the equipment and subcontracted the
remainder. Raytheon's price for just their PTD was $1.7
million, and many subvendors refused to provide their PTD.
The transition team decided that Raytheon's price was too
high and they decided to let NAVELEXDETMECH, Mechanicsburg
do the PTD. With Raytheon's assistance and by using reverse
engineering NAVELEXDETMECH was able to finish the PTD and
PPL by February 1983. The Supply System used this data to
make the requirements determinations decisions that led to
the large full scale support buyout of spares in September
1983. [Ref. 15]
In April 1981 the AN/SLQ-32 program was put in the
Detection Action Response Technique (DART) program. DART is
used for weapon systems that have major support and reli-
ability deficiencies. The troubled programs are micro-
managed toward specific thresholds. Action taken under the
DART program, as well as, action taken by the PM and NAVSUP
to improve system effectiveness will be presented in the
following chapter. Chapter III will present two measures of
effectiveness, Operational Availability (Ao) and Systems
Material Availability (SMA). These two measures are stan-
dards by which the Navy evaluates a weapon system's reli-
ability, maintainability and supportability . They are also





With the advent of new technologies and the increasing
complexities of systems today, combined with limited
resources and reduced budgets, it is essential that all
facets of a system be addressed on an integrated basis. If
the results are to be effective, logistics must be consid-
ered on an integral basis with all other elements of the
system. Logistics support must be initially planned and
integrated into the overall system development process to
assure an optimum balance between the prime equipment and
its related support. This balance considers the performance
characteristics of the system, the input resources required,
the effectiveness of the system, and the ultimate life cycle
cost. [Ref. l:p.3] The AN/SLQ-32 program is a classic
example of the problems systems effectiveness encounters
when logistics is not properly planned for in a weapon
system program.
This chapter will define two of the measures of effec-
tiveness by which weapon system support is evaluated. The
two measures of effectiveness, Operational Availability (Ao)
and Systems Material Availability (SMA) are two official
Navy standards which evaluate the systems logistic support,
reliability and maintainability. They are the basis for
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the initiatives that are taken to improve fleet support and
are presented in this thesis by separating the different
parts of their equation and then presenting the initiatives
as they effect those parts. This will assist in under-
standing the reasons for the initiatives and also show how
by attacking the different parts of the Ao equation NAVELEX
and NAVSUP improved the Ao
.
B. SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS
Systems effectiveness is often expressed as one or more
figures of merit representing the extent to which the system
is able to perform the intended function. The figures of
merit used may vary considerably depending on the type of
system and its mission requirements, and should consider the
following
1 System performance parameters, such as the capacity
range of frequency and accuracy of the identification
capability
.
2 Availability, or the measure of the degree a system is
in the operable and commitable state at the start of
the mission when the mission is called for at an
unknown random point in time. Availability is a func-
tion of operating time (reliability) and downtime
(maintainability/ support ability)
.
3 Dependability, or the measure of the systems operating
condition at one or more points during the mission,
given the systems condition at the start of the
mission. Dependability, like availability, is a func-
tion of operating time (reliability) and downtime
(maintainability/supportability ) . [Ref. 1]
A combination of these measures represents the systems
effectiveness aspect of total effectiveness. One can see
that logistics impacts the various elements of system
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effectiveness to a significant degree, particularly in the
areas of availability and dependability. The effects of the
type and quantity of logistics support is measured through
the parameters of system effectiveness. [Ref. l:p.48] This
thesis uses the parameter of Availability and demonstrates
how it is a function of reliability, maintainability and
support ability
.
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
1. Operational Availability
Operational Availability (Ao) is the probability
that a system or equipment, when used under stated condi-
tions in an actual operational environment, will operate
satisfactorily when called upon. It is an official Navy
measure of weapon system performance and each program has an
established goal. The AN/SLQ-32 Ao goal is 92%. The equation
of Ao is
MTBF
MTBF + MTTR + MSRT
where
:
MTBF = Mean Time Between Failure
MTTR = Mean Time To Repair
MSRT = Mean Supply Response Time
The efforts to improve Ao are looked at by separating each
part of the Ao equation and analyzing its contribution to
the total effectiveness.
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a. Mean Time Between Failures
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is a reli-
ability factor and is the mean or average time between all
maintenance actions, both preventive and corrective
[Ref. l:p.48]. To improve this portion of the equation
efforts were directed at improving system reliability. As
part of the Detection Action Response Team (DART) the
AN/SLQ-32 Reliability Improvement program was established to
address individual major problem parts. The program evalu-
ates data from the fleet, the repair depot, and the supply
system to identify the high failure rate items which
contribute most to fleet problems. Corrective action is
taken on problem parts to perform failure analysis inorder
to improve reliability and to initiate competitive procure-
ment when it will help improve reliability. [Ref. 16:p.l]
Based on this program of intensive and aggressive management
of problem parts, the critical system parts were identified,
prioritized and placed in a "Top Ten" moving window for
possible redesign, replacement with alternate vendor product
of greater reliability, development of organizational repair
capability or identification of Coordinated Shipboard
Allowance List (COSAL) augmentation requirements. As the
part under consideration achieves an established reliability
goal, it is removed from the program and another part is
inducted. [Ref. 17:p.l] Three examples of this for the
AN/SLQ-32 are the Traveling Wave Tube (TWT) Amplifier, the
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Radar Frequency Memory Unit (RFMU) and the Radar Frequency
(RF) cable assemblies. The RF cables were a major contrib-
utor to Casualty Reports (CASREPT). As a result, they are
now manufactured out of a more rugged material by NESEC,
Portsmouth under a work request funded by SPCC. The turn-
around time for these cables is less than two weeks and
CASREPT' s due to this parts failure are now infrequent. The
RFMU and the TWT Amplifier were two top CASREPT generators
that had their reliability improved significantly by
NAVELEX's efforts at designing new solid state upgrades of
the items. [Ref. 12 :pp. 32-37] The frequency of maintenance
for a given item is highly dependent on that item's reli-
ability. As the reliability of a system increases, the
frequency of maintenance will decrease. Maintenance and
logistics support requirements are highly influenced by this
reliability factor.
b. Mean Time to Repair
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) is a measure of the
mean corrective maintenance time. Each time that a system
fails, a series of steps is required to repair or restore
the system to its full operational status. These steps
include failure detection, fault isolation and disassembly,
on through to reassembly and repair verification. Completion
of these steps for a failed item is a corrective maintenance
cycle. MTTR is a composite value representing the arithmetic
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average of these individual maintenance cycle times.
[Ref. l:pp. 36-37] The best way to improve MTTR is by
improving the system's maintainability. To do this the orig-
inal maintenance philosophy was changed from depot level
repair to organizational and intermediate levels of repair.
The organizational level maintenance consists of
computer aided preventive and corrective maintenance. MTTR
is most effected by the ease of corrective maintenance,
which is performed by Electronic Warfare operator-
technicians (EW) at the organizational level. The need for
this corrective maintenance is detected through a combina-
tion of Built-in-Test (BIT) , System Operability Tests (SOT)
and System Diagnostic Testing (SDT) programs. BIT provides
continuous on-line testing of major portions of the system
to monitor the status of local power supplies, RF signal
levels and various operational status signals. Further
isolation of the unit in which the fault resides and the
type of fault present is accomplished by the operator
through the exercise of on-line SOT. The SOT is a collec-
tion of off-line subtests and special functions programmed
to diagnose and isolate system faults, either automatically
or with maintenance manual assistance, to a single repla-
cable assembly. These three systems along with the use of
the maintenance manual isolate the faulty assembly.
[Ref. 5:p.3-2] Much of the correction was done by the
removal of the failed part and returning it to the depot
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level for repair, recertif ication, and return to use. The
development of Test Program Sets (TPS) and micro-miniature
repair (2M) now presents opportunities for some inplace
repair work done by the EWs . There has also been improve-
ments in training of the technicians in fault isolation and
repair. [Ref. 18] Training was one of the areas that was
originally underfunded. As a result the EW technicians were
unfamiliar with the equipment and could not correctly
isolate the faults. This caused 60% of the items that were
turned in for repair to be incorrectly diagnosed as Not
Ready For Issue (NRFI).
c. Mean Supply Response Time
Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT) is the average
time required to satisfy customer demand. One of the defini-
tions of logistics is to have the right item, in the right
place, at the right time, in the right quantity, in the
right condition and at the right price. This definition
describes the MSRT challenge. It is the part of the Ao equa-
tion that NAVSUP is most responsible for. In order to
recover from the spares and repair funding shortfalls of FY
77-81, NAVSUP accelerated the transition to Navy support.
NAVSUP 's actions attempted to minimize the severity and
duration of the support problems that the fleet was experi-
encing. Accelerating the transition enabled NAVSUP to use
NSF money to purchase spares and fund the repair process. At
the MSD, 1 October 1983, $134.2 million of NSF had been
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invested in spares. The largest portion of those buys was
made in September 1983 after NAVELEXDETMECH had provided
SPCC with the Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD).
[Ref. 12: p. 10]. At the time of transition there were only
1900 parts Ready For Issue (RFI)in the contractor's repair
parts supply depot for turnover to SPCC. There is a two year
leadtime on all of the purchased material, making the fast
turnaround of Not Ready For Issue (NRFI) essential to the
supply support of the active systems in the fleet. In order
to dissolve the backlog of items awaiting repair and to
improve turnaround time SPCC fully funded the repair of NRFI
items at the Designated Overhaul Point (DOP). To further
reduce the turnaround time SPCC provided Raytheon with $1.9
million for them to have an onhand inventory of piece parts
[Ref. 12:p.l7]. Prior to that funding Raytheon would wait
and see what part came in for repair before ordering the
piece parts necessary to make the repair. Another effort to
reduce turnaround time was that NAVELEX established Naval
Weapons Support Center, Crane, Indiana as an organic DOP.
Crane currently has the capability to repair thirty-one
items. Similarly, SPCC contracted with subvendors for the
repair of the items they had manufactured. Previously
Raytheon had done the repair.
When the system was installed in the ships, the
contractor provided an Onboard Repair Parts (OBRP) kit. The
kit was not very useful because only 2 of the top 10 failed
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parts were provided in the kit [Ref. 12:p.2-l]. In 1984,
using several years worth of usage data and the now provided
PTD, SPCC provided ships with a mini-COSAL that specified
the authorized onboard allowance quantities. Ships requisi-
tioned the items that they were authorized and did not
already have. These requisitions are given priority by the
contractor. Another measure to improve MSRT was by approving
forward positioning of stocks. Priorities are given to
having stocks placed in the Mobile Logistics Support Force
(MLSF) ships' Fleet Issue Load List (FILL), the Tender and
Repair Ships Load List (TARSLL), and the supply centers and
depots at Subic, Yokosuka and Pearl Harbor. [Ref. 19:p.l4]
The quarterly Operational Availability figures
for the AN/SLQ-32s' three different variants, V(l), V(2) and
V(3) along with their installed fleet population are shown
in Table I.
The V(3) variant is more technical and complex
then the other variants and for this reason it is providing
the most problems. The Ao for the V(l) and V(2) has never
dropped below 61%, whereas, the V(3) Ao has yet to rise
above 62%. Many of the reliability and maintainability
initiatives previously addressed were attempts to positively
affect the V(3) Operational Availability (Ao). The Ao figure
shows an increasing percentage of availability. The V(l) and
V(2) variants have almost attained the 92% Ao goal, but the




QTR V(l) (Pop) Y(2) (Pop) Yd) (Pop) Total
Mar 81 76% (11) 82% (30) 62% (10) 77%
Jun 73% (16) 92% (38) 23% (12) 75%
Sept 71% (20) 83% (40) 21% (14) 68%
Dec 80% (24) 7 6% (45) 38% (16) 70%
Mar 82 7 6% (24) 73% (55) 17% (20) 66%
Jun 66% (24) 70% (65) 41% (20) 64%
Sept 75% (28) 64% (72) 16% (23) 58%
Dec 76% (29) 65% (80) 31% (25) 61%
Mar 83 68% (30) 68% (90) 35% (32) 64%
Jun 71% (34) 82% (96) 40% (36) 66%
Sept 67% (34) 72% (102) 45% (37) 62%
Dec * 61% (36) 72% (107) 50% (41) 62%
Mar 84 66% (37) 80% (110) 5 3% (43) 68%
Jun 68% (39) 7 7% (113) 54% (46) 75%
Sep 78% (40) 80% (118) 56% (47) 77%
Dec 83% (43) 85% (121) 58% (50) 7 9%
Mar 85 7 9% (44) 85% (124) 60% (50) 81%
Jun 91% (44) 91% (129) 62% (52) 87%
where
:
% = Ao = MTBF / MTBF + MTTR + MSRT
Pop = population = number of units intalled in the
fleet
V(l), V(2), V(3) = different AN/SLQ-32 variants
installed ( see figure 2.1 )
* = Material Support Date ( MSD )
goal. The intense management of the DART program is
continuing to produce good results and improve the MTBF and
MTTR. This is evidenced by the fact that the Navy Material
Support Date (MSD) occurred in October 1983 and the Ao
figures continued to improve. Usually there is some support
degradation upon transition because the dedicated attention
that the PM gets from a contractor during the interim
support period cannot be replicated in kind by the Navy
system. The contractor support network is uniquely tuned to
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program requirements and supplemented with engineering
expertise. Upon transition, support must fit the Navy struc-
ture and compete for attention with other important programs
[Ref. 15]. However, the DART program is maintaining the
dedicated attention to the AN/SLQ-32 program that is needed
to improve its' Ao . During the next several months SPCC is
due to receive delivery of the large purchase of spares that
was made in FY's 81 and 82. This material will fill the
ships allowances and provide the supply system with an
adequate inventory in the retail and wholesale stocks. This
should greatly improve MSRT
.
2 . System Material Availability
System Material Availability (SMA) is a wholesale
performance measure for the inventory control point and is
defined as a percent of requisitions that are satisfied on
the first pass against supply system assets [Ref. 7]. The
SMA equation is :




DVD = Direct Vendor Deliveries Established
DEMANDS = requisitions to the Navy supply system
for parts
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) goal for SMA is 85%. The
SMA data shown in Table II for the An/SLQ-32 was collected
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The SMA in November 1983 was at an all time low of
49.5%. Then it increased steadily to a peak of 84.4% in
February and March 1984. It remained near that value until
July 1984 when it started a quick decline to another low of
54.5% in August 1984. This sudden and quick drop was in
conjunction with an increase in backorders from 623 to 1480.





























requisitions that were building up due to the issuing of the
mini-Consolidated Shipboard Allowance Lists (COSAL).The
other sudden drop off occurs in April/May 1985. This was a
consequence of the Ships Parts Control Centers (SPCC) deci-
sion to no longer count all initial COSAL requisitions as
demands against the system. Instead requisitions are
deferred until the expected delivery date of the system
stock that had been previously contracted for. Many of the
items were delayed and were unable to meet the original
contract delivery date. At that point, when the material
became overdue, the previously deferred demands suddenly hit
the system as unfilled requisitions and lowered SPCC '
s
effectiveness figures. [Ref. 20]
All of the actions taken to improve Mean Supply
Response Time (MSRT) will also improve the SMA figures.
The large purchase of spares, the action to reduce turn-
around time, distribution of the mini-COSAL and forward
positioning are all actions that are contributing to the
steady rise of SMA.
D. COST REDUCTION
By citing the initiatives taken to improve Ao and SMA we
have attempted to meet the item, place, time, condition and
quantity parts of the logistics definition. The one piece of
that definition that is not discussed is that piece of the
logistics definition that requires the needed item to be at
the right price. Even though all the initiatives mentioned
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were made considering fiscal constraints, there are also
cost reduction measures that should be presented.
The AN/SLQ-32, like other weapon systems, has been
subjected to high level scrutiny over the issue of spare
parts pricing. SPCC, by working in conjunction with NAVELEX
and Raytheon, has successfully timed major provisioning buys
of parts to coincide with NAVELEX' s AN/SLQ-32 system acqui-
sitions. This economy of scale has brought about a 10-15%
savings by having the contractor purchase in quantity from
his vendors and by establishing longer production runs.
Raytheon has identified over 270 vendor items that can be
purchased directly from the vendors. [Ref. 19: p. 27] In an
attempt to breakout the parts for competition, SPCC
requested that Raytheon and the subvendors provide SPCC with
level III drawings for Provisioning Technical Documentation
(PTD) because the PTD done previously by NAVELEXDETMECH was
not detailed enough for the purpose of breakout. These
detailed drawings would be used by the Navy to get other
companies to manufacture the part. The reasoning being that
the competition on the part would result in a lower priced
part. The current manufacturers realized this so they added
their estimated lost revenues on to the drawings price. The
total asking price for the level III drawings was $45
million. The price was not considered to be cost effective
to the Navy. Instead, in order to still attempt to breakout
the parts, the Navy purchased Best Commercial Drawings
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Packages (level II drawings )for $930,000. Many of the level
two drawings are detailed enough to use for the breakout of
parts for competitive bid. [Ref. 21]
E . SUMMARY
This chapter provides information and analysis of the
Navy's actions in attacking the program's reliability, main-
tainability and supply support problems. The measures of
effectiveness for these three areas are Operational
Availability (Ao) and Systems Material Availability (SMA).
There are three parts to the Ao equation, Mean Time Between
Failure (MTBF), Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) and Mean Supply
Response Time (MSRT). In order to better understand the
initiatives taken to improve Ao , each initiative is categor-
ized to that part of the equation that it effects. By
attacking each part of the equation separately, the total
result, Ao , has improved. The SMA statistics are a measure
of supply support and the initiatives that effect MSRT
directly influence the SMA percentages.
The acceleration of the transition to Navy supply
support was necessary in order to provide a remedy for the
poor support that the system was receiving. The early tran-
sition could not give a quick solution to the problem that,
because of the prior logistic deficiencies, was still
several years away from its goal. What the early transition
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did provide was an organized, adequately funded, logistics
support plan. The Ao and SMA statistics display steady
improvement, but these steady improvements will become
harder to attain as time goes on. The easily recognizable
problems were corrected first and the results were signifi-
cant, but further initiatives cannot be expected to show
improvements in a linear manner. The intensified management
of troubled areas must be continued and the Detection Action
Response Team (DART) program is significant in providing
proper visibility to the projects troubled areas.
Many of the actions that were taken would not have been
necessary, had proper logistics planning been taken on early
in the program. The AN/SLQ-32 program is a prime example of
how poor logistics planning undermines the systems effec-
tiveness to the user.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
Chapter I indicated that this thesis sought to answer
the question " What are the Supply Support Problems in the
AN/SLQ-32 Program and How is the Navy Solving These Problems
With Respect to Operational Availability and System Material
Availability." The AN/SLQ-32 Program was picked for this
study because it was one of the most poorly supported weapon
systems in the fleet , and it offered an opportunity to
research the consequences that result from poor logistic
planning and management.
Chapters II and III concentrated on presenting the
systems support problems and then categorizing the Navy's
corrective actions according to their effect on reliability,
maintainability and supportability . It is presented this way
in order to emphasize the importance of logistic planning
early in the systems life cycle and to highlight the roles
of reliability, maintainability and supportability in
providing system support effectiveness.
Chapter III presented and gave brief analysises of the
initiatives that were taken by the Navy to improve the
systems support. Two measures of effectiveness, Operational
Availability (Ao) and Systems Material Availability (SMA)
were presented as a focal point for establishing an
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organized plan to improve the systems support. The different
parts of the Ao equation, Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF),
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) and Mean Supply Response Time
(MSRT), are defined and each is presented in relation to the
support improvement initiatives that are enacted. It is
demonstrated that by using this approach Ao and SMA percent-
ages were steadily increasing towards their goals. The next
section presents an analysis of the decisions that brought
about the problems that are described in Chapter II.
B. ANALYSIS
1. Design-to-Cost
The AN/SLQ-32 was developed under the
Design-To-Price concept. While this program was good for
promoting competition and state of the art technology, it
also presented problems that effected logistic support deci-
sions. The primary goal was to meet certain specified opera-
tional requirements within the pre-established price. This
gave the contractor too much liberty to make trade-offs
among the factors of reliability, maintainability and
supportability . It was easier and more cost effective to the
contractor for him keep the equipment complex and require
that he perform the depot level repair rather then spend on
the research and development to simplify the equipment for
shipboard repair. Similarly, in order to keep costs down,
contractors were allowed to use state of the art technology
and were not bound to the Navy's standardization
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requirements. The standardization policy requires that
contractors, whenever possible, use equipment that is
already in the Navy inventory.
There are disadvantages to these two policies. There
is low confidence given to a new products reliability
predictions and the system has complete dependance on the
contractor for repair. The contractor has little incentive
to improve an item's reliability knowing he is the sole
depot level repair facility. His tendency is to continue
with the current maintenance plan and forgo any reliability
improvements that would jeopardize the repair contract.
These things cause the life cycle management of the system
configuration management, supply support and equipment
repair to default to the contractor. Total dependence on
the contractor for these services in peacetime may be more
cost effective to the government for a weapon system that is
permanently based in the United States, but not for systems
such as the AN/SLQ-32, that deploy and are used during
wartime. The logistics of supporting these units from a
single contractor would not be feasible and would degrade
readiness
.
2. Interim Support and Transition
The Logistics Plan, which called for an interim
contractor support period that would be evaluated in its
third year in order to determine the effectiveness of the
contractors support, was not considered in the decision
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making done by the PM's. Their decisions were based on the
belief that the contractor would provide the life cycle
support. This was one of the reasons that Provisioning
Technical Documentation (PTD) was not purchased and why
SPCC, was not involved in the initial phases of the program.
PTD must be purchased in the early phases of the program
when the contractor still has an incentive to provide it. As
shown in chapter II, the lack of PTD caused problems for the
transition to Navy support and also increased the eventual
PTD price tag to 45 million dollars.
There was no transition planning because the PM did
not recognize the realities of the environment under which
the weapon system would be deployed in the fleet. It is not
feasible to rely completely on contractor support for equip-
ment that will be on deployed units. The Navy Supply System
support philosophy and inventory modeling is based upon
having the proper distribution of spares on deployed units
and at the shore supply activities.
3 . Supply Support and Repair Cycle Funding
Chapter II presented the problems caused by the lack
of funding for spares and the repair cycle. This is due to
the fundamental conflict that arises between the PM's needs
and the logisticions needs. The PM has allegiance to his
program sponsor. Their interest is in getting as many new
systems into the fleet, as fast as possible. This is the
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PM's major concern and is the overiding factor in any cost
trade-offs that are made. [Ref. 22]
The PM's tour of duty with the program is only about
three years, and he is evaluated on what he can accomplish
during that time period. He is not held responsible for
future problems that arise as a consequence of his early
trade-off decisions. The PM wants those systems in the
fleet, and is willing to accept overly optimistic reli-
ability, maintainability and supportability predictions. As
in this case, the funding of spares and repair was traded
off in order to get the weapon systems delivered.
C. CONCLUSION
The trade-offs in weapon system procurement are almost
always at the expense of the logistics support. The effects
of these early trade-offs are felt by the end user of the
equipment for several years after the system is installed
and operating. As with the AN/SLQ-32, there is installed
equipment that, in its initial years, has no chance of
meeting its Ao goals. The accelerated transition to Navy
support of the AN/SLQ-32 could not remedy this, but it did
provide an organized plan for improving the systems logis-
tics support. The thesis showed the steady improvements that
were made in Ao and SMA as a result of this logistics plan,
but this effort was made only after the weapon system was
identified as a logistics disaster.
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The solution to these logistic problems is simple in
concept and not new, but difficult to comply with. The
solution is to ensure that a sound logistics support plan is
established early in the program and that it is adhered to
and monitored. [Ref . 22] There is a stronger awareness now
of the importance of proper logistics support planning.
Reference 2 refers to how NAVELEX has increased the
authority of their Logistics 08 Code in the weapon support
programs. Logistic Review Groups (LRG's) have also been
given more authority and a more significant role in the
weapon systems planning. NAVSUP and SPCC are getting
involved early in the logistics planning and this has
enabled problems to be identified early and be solved,
rather then deferring them. Reference 23, The NAVSUP
Integrated Logistics Support Handbook provides guidance and
check off lists to the PM's on proper logistics planning and
interim support. There are still many problems with the PM's
commitment to logistics, but this new awareness does provide
the PM with more incentives to make trade-off decisions in
favor of logistics support.
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